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ALD-021        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2339 
___________ 
 
JOHN J. MCCARTHY, 
      Appellant 
    
v. 
 
WARDEN LEWISBURG USP 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 1:14-cv-01905) 
District Judge:  Honorable William W. Caldwell 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect and  
Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 22, 2015 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  October 29, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 John J. McCarthy appeals pro se from the District Court’s order denying his 
petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Because this appeal 
presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  
I. 
 McCarthy is a federal prisoner serving a 235-month sentence imposed by the 
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut for possession of a firearm by 
a previously convicted felon.  This appeal concerns his most recent 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
habeas petition, in which he alleged that: (1) his constitutional rights were violated when 
he was placed in the Special Management Unit (“SMU”); (2) his federal sentence was 
erroneously calculated; and (3) his constitutional rights were violated during a 
disciplinary proceeding that resulted in the loss of good conduct time.  The Magistrate 
Judge issued a report recommending that his first claim be dismissed as not cognizable 
under § 2241, that the second claim be denied as an abuse of the writ, and that the third 
claim be denied as unexhausted.  On March 17, 2015, after considering McCarthy’s 
objections, the District Court issued an order adopting the Magistrate Judge’s report and 
denying McCarthy’s § 2241 petition.   
 McCarthy now appeals.1 
                                              
1 McCarthy’s May 20, 2015 notice of appeal ordinarily would be untimely.  See Fed. R. 
App. P. 4(a)(1)(B).  In this case, however, the District Court’s March 17, 2015 order does 
not comply with the “separate document” requirement of Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure because the order sets forth the history of the case and addresses 
McCarthy’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation.  See 
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II. 
 A certificate of appealability is not required to appeal from the denial of a § 2241 
petition, see Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009), and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s legal conclusions, but we review factual findings for clear error.  Vega v. United 
States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).  We find no error in the District Court’s denial 
of McCarthy’s § 2241 petition, and summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  See 3d 
Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.   
 First, the District Court properly determined that § 2241 is not the proper vehicle 
for McCarthy to challenge his transfer to the SMU, which occurred due to his history of 
disciplinary infractions.  For such a claim to be cognizable under § 2241, the transfer 
would have to “concern the execution of [McCarthy’s] sentence,” which requires that the 
Federal Bureau of Prison’s (“BOP”) “conduct was somehow inconsistent with a 
command or recommendation in the sentencing judgment,” or that the transfer 
“necessarily result[ed] in a change to the duration of his sentence.”  Cardona v. Bledsoe, 
681 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542-44 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (holding that civil rights action is appropriate to challenge conditions of 
confinement when a finding in plaintiff’s favor would not alter the sentence or undue the 
                                                                                                                                                 
LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2007).    
Thus, McCarthy’s appeal is timely and will not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  See 
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii). 
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conviction).  McCarthy’s petition alleged neither that transfer affected the duration of his 
sentence nor that it was inconsistent with the sentencing judgment.  Accordingly, the 
District Court properly dismissed this claim.   
 Second, the District Court properly denied McCarthy’s challenge to the 
calculation of his sentence as an abuse of the writ.  In 1994, McCarthy was sentenced for 
convictions in both federal and state court in Connecticut.  He is currently serving his 
federal sentence, which he began after completing his state sentence.  The Connecticut 
federal court did not specify whether his sentences should run concurrently or 
consecutively.  The BOP has treated them as consecutive and has denied McCarthy’s 
request for a favorable concurrent retroactive designation under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).  
Since 1995, McCarthy has filed numerous § 2241 petitions in various courts arguing that 
the BOP has erred by refusing to treat his sentence as concurrent.  See, e.g., McCarthy v. 
Warden USP Lewisburg, 448 F. App’x 287, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2011) (summarizing 
McCarthy’s previous litigation of this issue); McCarthy v. Warden, 544 F. App’x 52, 53 
(3d Cir. 2013) (same).  
 As he has argued previously, McCarthy states that his “concurrent state time 
should be credited to [his] recommended concurrent federal time as presentence or 
precustody confinement.”2  The BOP asserted that this claim should be denied as an 
                                              
2 McCarthy also asserts that the BOP abused its discretion in denying his request for 
concurrent retroactive designation because it did not consider the “positive programs” 
that he has completed while in prison.  We addressed and rejected that argument in 
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abuse of the writ because the legality of McCarthy’s detention had already been 
determined in his previous habeas petitions.  The District Court agreed, explaining that 
McCarthy has “previously, repeatedly and unsuccessfully challenged” his sentence 
calculation by the BOP.  And because the Government met its burden to plead abuse of 
the writ with “clarity and particularity,” McCarthy had to show that the “ends of justice 
would be served by the court entertaining his petition, a showing that the petitioner 
satisfies by supplementing his claim by making a colorable showing of factual 
innocence.”  See Furnari v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 531 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  This he did not do.  Accordingly, the 
District Court properly determined that McCarthy’s sentencing claim was an abuse of the 
writ.  
 Finally, we agree with the District Court that McCarthy failed to exhaust his claim 
concerning his 2014 disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in the loss of 40 days of 
good conduct time.  Section 2241 is the appropriate vehicle for constitutional claims 
when a prison disciplinary proceedings results in the loss of good conduct time.  See 
Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008).  Federal prisoners have a liberty 
interest in statutory good time credits.  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 
(1974).  Thus, due process protections are required “[w]here a prison disciplinary hearing 
may result in the loss of good time credits.”  Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 
                                                                                                                                                 
McCarthy’s 2013 appeal from the denial of a previous § 2241 petition, and we decline to 
address it again.  See McCarthy, 544 F. App’x at 55.   
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(1985) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67).  McCarthy’s claim that his disciplinary 
proceeding did not include the required procedures is, however, barred from judicial 
review because it is procedurally defaulted.    
 Federal prisoners are ordinarily required to exhaust administrative remedies before 
filing a § 2241 petition.  Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 
1996).  Exhaustion is favored because:  
(1) judicial review may be facilitated by allowing the 
appropriate agency to develop a factual record and apply its 
expertise; (2) judicial time may be conserved because the 
agency might grant the relief sought, and (3) administrative 
autonomy requires that an agency be given an opportunity to 
correct its own errors.  
  
See Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981).  McCarthy, in his traverse 
filed with the District Court, conceded that he did not exhaust administrative remedies.  
And despite his arguments to the contrary, we see no reason why exhaustion would not 
have achieved the above-referenced goals such that we should excuse this requirement 
here.  See id.   
 Because McCarthy cannot now complete the administrative remedy process, he 
has procedurally defaulted this claim and must demonstrate cause and prejudice to secure 
judicial review.  See Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761-62.  McCarthy’s assertion that he was 
unable to file his administrative remedy because the prison staff refused to provide him 
with the necessary forms is not sufficient to excuse his failure to exhaust.  The 
documentary evidence provided by the BOP shows that McCarthy was advised of his 
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right to appeal the disciplinary decision and was given a copy of the disciplinary report.  
The BOP conceded that the delivery of the Disciplinary Hearing Office’s packet was 
delayed but stated that the delay did not hinder McCarthy’s ability to appeal, because he 
was advised that he could appeal within 20 days of receiving the packet.  McCarthy did 
not, however, file an appeal and the untimely delivery of the packet did not foreclose 
McCarthy’s use of the administrative review process.  Accordingly, as the District Court 
determined, this claim is barred.  See 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(b) (setting forth procedures for 
filing administrative appeals).   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm.  See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 
